EBRCN Resource Legislation.

The European Biological Resource Centre Network Information Resource

The safe handling and distribution of micro-organisms and the law

There is extensive legislation concerning the safe handling and distribution of micro-organisms at the national, regional and international levels. Micro-organisms of hazard groups 2, 3 and 4 are hazardous substances and as such fall under the EU Biological Agents Directive and are dangerous goods as defined by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods Regulations where requirements for their packaging are defined.  Further, there are restrictions on distribution imposed by National Postal Authorities where more and more countries prohibit receipt of Infectious materials formerly Infectious, Perishable Biological Substances (IPBS) and, in some cases, Perishable Biological Substances formerly Non-infectious Perishable Biological Substances (NPBS).  More recently the use of microorganisms in bioterrorism has lept to the forefront reminding us of the control measures in place for access to dangerous pathogens.  The legislation and supporting documents are often difficult to find and understand.  The European Biological Resource Centre Network (EBRCN) offer advice and interpretation to help the implementation of such legislation.

Background..... 1

Health and Safety..... 2

Classification of Micoorganisms on the Basis of Hazard.....2

Quarantine regulations..... 3

Postal Regulations and Safety..... 3

Packaging..... 3

Regulations governing distribution of cultures.....4

Legislation on the Proliferation, Distribution and Misuse of Dangerous Pathogens..... 4

Export Licensing Measures.....4

European..... 5

Convention on Biological Diversity.....6

Ownership of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).....6

Safety information provided to the recipient of microorganisms..... 7

Summary.....7

References..... 8

Background

Microorganisms are isolated, grown, characterised, preserved and stored and transported between laboratories.  They are shipped by various means, by mail, courier or by hand, from one laboratory to another within countries and often across borders or continents.  They are sent for identification, reference, research or for production purposes from colleague to colleague, from and to culture collections.  All these actions must be carried out safely and compliant with the various legislation and regulations that control these matters. Not only does the legislation exist but from time to time it is changed or added to (http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp/wfcc/wfccreports.pdf).

The importance of a laboratory乫s health and safety procedures stretch beyond the laboratory to all those who may come in contact with substances and products from that laboratory.  A microorganism in transit will put carriers, postal staff, freight operators and recipients at risk, some organisms being relatively hazard free whilst others quite dangerous.   It is essential that safety and shipping regulations are followed to ensure safe transit. There are several other pieces of legislation that restrict the distribution of microorganisms of which a microbiologist must be aware.  Attention is drawn to these and information sources are provided to ensure that microbiologists remain within the law.

Guidelines on the operation of culture collections

It is critical that biological resource centres operate to high standards and currently there are some guidelines available for adoption and use.  One of the goals of the EBRCN project is to establish a European Standard for the operation of biological resource centres.  Some examples of guidelines and quality management systems are:

CABRI http://www.cabri.org/guidelines/gl-framed.html

WFCC http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp/wfcc/GuideFinal.html

UKNCC http://www.ukncc.co.uk/html/Information/docs/UKNCCQAP.doc

Table 1 List of some of the regulations governing microbiological activities

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp

Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (done at Budapest on April 28, 1977 and amended on September 26, 1980) http://www.cnpat.com/worldlaw/treaty/budapest_en.htm

Convention on Biological Diversity http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp

EC Directive 93/88/EEC on Biological Agents http://eur-op.eu.int/opnews/395/en/r3633.html for purchase through Celex

EC Directive 90/679/EEC setting mandatory control measures for laboratories http://eur-op.eu.int/opnews/395/en/r3633.html for purchase through Celex

Accord Européen relatif au transport international des merchandises dangereuses par routes (ADR).  http://eur-op.eu.int/opnews/395/en/r3633.html for purchase through Celex

IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) http://www.iata.org/cargo/dg/dgr.htm

UK Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW) Regulations 1992 (Anon, 1992) http://www.hmso.gov.uk/cgi-bin/htm_hl3?URL=http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/19993242.htm&
STEMMER=en&WORDS=management+health+safeti+work+&
COLOUR=Red&STYLE=s#muscat_highlighter_first_match

UK Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) regulations (1988)

 http://www.hmso.gov.uk/cgi-bin/htm_hl3?URL=http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1988/
Uksi_19881657_en_2.htm&STEMMER=en&WORDS=control+substanc+hazard+health+&
COLOUR=Red&STYLE=s#muscat_highlighter_first_match

EU Council Regulation 3381/94/EEC on the Control of Exports of Dual-Use Goods from the Community of 19th December 1994 (Official J. L 367, p1) and amendments http://eur-op.eu.int/opnews/395/en/r3633.html

EEC Directives 90/219/EEC. Contained use of genetically modified microorganisms (GMO's), *L117 Volume 33, 8 May 1990. http://biosafety.ihe.be/Menu/BiosEur1.html

EEC Directives 90/220/EEC. Release of GMO's, *L117 Volume 33, 8 May 1990.

http://biosafety.ihe.be/Menu/BiosEur1.html

Health and Safety

Whether it is compliance with the law or duties of a caring employer the basic requirements in order to establish a safe workplace are:

· Adequate assessment of risks.

· Provision of adequate control measures.

· Provision of health and safety information.

· Provision of appropriate training.

· Establishment of record systems to allow safety audits to be carried out.

· Implementation of good working procedures.

Good working practice requires assurance that correct procedures are actually being followed and this requires a sound and accountable safety policy. http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hsc13.htm

Microorganisms as hazardous substances

The UK Management of Health and Safety at Work (MHSW) Regulations 1992 (Anon, 1992) are all encompassing and general in nature but overlap and lead into many specific pieces of legislation.  The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) regulations require that every employer makes a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to health and safety to which any person whether employed by them or not may be exposed to through their work (Anon, 1996b), a risk assessment.  These assessments must be reviewed regularly in addition to and when changes in procedures or regulations demand, and must be recorded when the employer has more than five employees.   The distribution of microorganisms to others outside the workplace extends these duties to protect others.  The organism must be assessed for all types of hazard it presents not on infection but also on the basis of toxin production for example the mycotoxins or bacterial toxins.

Classification of Microorganisms on the Basis of Hazard

Various classification systems exist which include:

World Health Organisation (WHO) www.who.org/emc/biosafe/index.htm;

United States Public Health service (USPHS);

Advisory Committee for Dangerous Organisms (ACDP);

European Forum for Biotechnology (EFB)

EC Directive (93/88/EEC) on Biological Agents

In Europe the EC Directive (93/88/EEC) on Biological Agents sets a common base line which has been strengthened and expanded in many of the individual member states.  In the UK the definition and minimum handling procedures of pathogenic organisms are set by the ACDP who list four hazard groups 1-4 with corresponding containment levels.  Similarly other European Countries have advisory committees, in Germany the ZKBS advises on how individual Genetically Engineered Microorganisms (GEMs) and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) should be classified and the Trade Corporation Association of the Chemical Industry (BG Chemie) is involved in both.  The Advisory Committee on Genetic Manipulation (ACGM) prescribe separate but similar regulations for those organisms that have been genetically modified. 

EU legislation on GMOs:

COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (90/219/EEC) on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms 23 April 1990

COUNCIL Directive (90/220/EEC) on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms 3 April 1990

COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 94/51/EC of 7 November 1994, adapting to technical progress Council Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms

COMMISSION DECISION (94/730/EC) of 4 November 1994, establishing simplified procedures concerning the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified plants pursuant to Article 6 (5)of Council Directive 90/220/EEC

This and other EU Legislation concerning transport of GMOs or pathogenic organisms and that pertaining to biotechnological safety can be found at:

http://biosafety.ihe.be/Menu/BiosEur.html

United Nations Industrial Development Organisation

· Voluntary code of conduct for the release of organisms into the environment

The text can be found at http://binas.unido.org/binas/regs.php3

Quarantine regulations

Quarantine legislation is in place in countries world wide restricting the import of non-indigenous plant and animal pathogens.  Those who wish to import such organisms must hold the relevant import permit which can be obtained from the relevant country authority for example – Canada, UK, USA. Information on the transport of plant pathogens throughout Europe can be obtained from the European and Mediterranean Plant, Protection Organisation (EPPO), 1 rue le Nôtre, 75016 Paris, France .

Postal Regulations and Safety

Countries have their own regulations governing the packaging and transport of biological material in their domestic mail.  International Postal Regulations regarding the postage of human and animal pathogens are very strict on account of the safety hazard they present.  There are several organisations that set regulations controlling the international transfer of such material.  These include the International Air Transport Association (IATA), International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).  It is common place to send microorganisms by post, as this is more convenient and less expensive than air freight.   However, many countries prohibit the movement of biological substances through their postal services.  The International Bureau of the UPU in Berne publishes all import and export restrictions for biological materials by national postal services.  This information can also be found in the countries table published in the DSMZ Shipping of infectious, non-infectious and genetically modified biological materials  International Regulations (http://www.gbf.de/dsmz/shipping/shipping.htm).

Further information

Packaging

IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (DGR) require that packaging used for the transport of hazard group 2, 3 or 4 must meet defined standards, IATA packing instruction 602 (class 6.2) (IATA, 2002). Packaging must meet EN 829 triple containment requirements for hazard group 1 organisms.  However, microorganisms that qualify as dangerous goods (class 6.2) must be in UN certified packages.  These packages must be sent by air freight if the postal services of the countries through which it passes do not allow the organisms in their postal systems.  They can only be sent airmail if the National Postal authorities accept them.  There are additional costs above the freight charges and package costs if the carrier does not have its own fleet which will require the package and documentation to be checked at the airport DGR centre.

Further information

 

Regulations governing distribution of cultures

The IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations require that shippers of microorganisms of hazard groups 2, 3 or 4 must be trained by IATA certified and approved instructors.  They also require shippers declaration forms, which should accompany the package in duplicate, and specified labels are used for organisms in transit by air (IATA, 2002).  There are several other regulations that impose export restrictions on the distribution of microorganisms.  These include control of distribution of agents that could be used in biological warfare, EU Council Regulation 3381/94/EEC on the control of export of dual-use goods (Official J. L 367, p1) and more generally countries are currently implementing Access Regulations to Genetic Resources under the Convention on Biological Diversity, transport of goods by road.  It is critical that microbiologists are aware of and follow such legislation.

Some cultures represent a health hazard, and for post and packaging purposes these are placed into four classes by the UPU.

Further information

Web links to further information on transport and shipping

France has introduced new legislation for the well-known shipper for example example this law is used to prevent the Xray of products sent by the Institut Pasteur, it is called "the expéditeurs connus".

Legislation on the Proliferation, Distribution and Misuse of Dangerous Pathogens

 

There is considerable concern over the transfer of selected infectious agents capable of causing substantial harm to human health.  There is potential for such organisms to be passed to parties not equipped to handle them or to persons who may make illegitimate use of them.  Of special concern are pathogens and toxins causing anthrax, botulism, brucellosis, plague, Q fever, tularemia and all agents classified for work at Biosafety Level 4 (hazard group 4).  There is control legislation in place and some of this is described below.

The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) provide information for example "Contact Information for Select Agent Preservation" is available at the WFCC site http://www.wfcc.info/ and "Biosafety" section of http://www.wdcm.org/.  The document is on the issue of preserving

(dangerous) agents for research for the human welfare. The title of the menu in the Web page is " US legislation concerning select  agents". The relevant links are embedded in the document.

Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) (The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ) was signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.  There are currently 162 country signatories of which 18 are still to ratify.

· Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction

The text can be found at http://binas.unido.org/binas/regs.php3

Following the signing of the BTWC countries have introduced new control legislation or procedures to prevent unauthorised access to strains that could be misused in this way.  An Ad Hoc Group is currently discussing a verification protocol for the BWC, such a protocol is now in place for the CWC.

Further information

"Countering Bioterrorism: DOE - Funded DNA-Based Technologies Track Identity, Origin of Biological Agents" is retrievable at Human Genome Web site

http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/publicat/hgn/v12n1/01bioterror.html

Export Licensing Measures

Article III of the BWC obliges the States Parties not to transfer to any recipient what so ever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any States, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

This is a legally binding obligation. A number of countries have implemented national export licensing measures as an effective means of implementing these obligations and to avoid the possibility of the inadvertent supply of any item which could be used in a BW program.

Export licenses are not bans. They operate to deter proliferation by monitoring trade of relevant materials, and provide authority to stop a sale in the infrequent cases where a prospective export is likely to contribute to a BW program. It is also in the interest of industry and research institutes to ensure that such firms and institutes are not inadvertently supplying pathogens and dual-use equipment for use in the production of BW.

The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

http://www.opcw.nl/fact/rel_conv.htm

USA

The USA have rules that include a comprehensive list of infectious agents, registration of facilities that handle them, requirements for transfer, verification and disposal and that carry criminal and civil penalties.  In the UK all facilities handling hazard group 2, 3 or 4 must be registered.  Strict control of hazard group 3 and 4 organisms is in place.

The US Biological Safety Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents
In response to a Congressional mandate in 1997, CDC promulgated a regulation, Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents. The select agents were drawn from the Australia List and includes forty or so microorganisms, a dozen toxins, and certain recombinant DNA molecules. Institutions were provided Registration Packages that included a self-assessing laboratory survey form based on the CDC/NIH publication, Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. Each registered facility is to be inspected by personnel from the OHS during a three year cycle. To date there are 67 laboratories registered. This presentation will provide a status report on the activities associated with implementing this regulation. CDC is currently working to develop a plan to address the role of Public Health to meet the growing national concerns about bioterrorism.

Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents : 42 CFR Part 72.6, 1996

Public Health Chapter I--Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services Part 71--Foreign Quarantine-Subpart F--Importations Sec. 71.54 Etiological agents, hosts, and vectors. (a) A person may not import into the United States , nor distribute after importation, any etiological agent or any arthropod or other animal host or vector of human disease, or any exotic living arthropod or other animal capable of being a host or vector of human disease unless accompanied by a permit issued by the Director. (b) Any import coming within the provisions of this section will not be released from custody prior to receipt by the District Director of the U.S. Customs Service of a permit issued by the Director.

European

The European Union has adopted a common position with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/btwc-EU-commpos.html

Delivery of microorganisms which could be used as biological weapons is controlled by the EU Council Regulation 3381/94 <documents/EuropeanCouncilRegulationl.rtf> on the Control of Exports of Dual-use Goods from the Community and by the resp. EU Council Decision of December 1994 with its Annex I  <documents/annexes.pdf>(Publication L367/8/EEC of 31.12.1994 and amendments).

France

France have introduced regulations on high pathogenic strains (AFSSAPS). Information can be found in french on http://www.afssaps.sante.fr/.

Control procedures:

UKNCC control of Dangerous Pathogens

The UK have put in place a code of practice for UK public service collections to follow. The Australia Group has strict controls for movement outside their group of countries but has lower restrictions within.  The list of Australia Group controlled organisms is modified periodically. The UK National Culture Collections are implementing a system involving the registration of customers to ensure bone fide supply when there is any doubt associated with giving access to potentially organisms. http://www.ukncc.co.uk/html/Databases/Control%20Distibution.htm. Access to the organisms on the Australia Group list plus additional organisms of concern are controlled.  A list of such organisms has been compiled by the UKNCC, which includes plant, animal and human pathogens.

Some biosafety related sites:

The European Federation Biotechnology Working Party on Safety in Biotechnology http://www.boku.ac.at/iam/efb/

The European Biological Safety Association http://www.ebsa.be/

The American Biological Safety Association http://www.orcbs.msu.edu

The Belgian Biosafety Server with lots of links http://biosafety.ihe.be/

World Health Organisation WHO  http://www.who.ch

UNIDO Bio Informations Network http://binas.unido.org/binas/binas.html

International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) in Trieste

 http://www.icgeb.trieste.it/~bsafesrv/

Some BTWC related sites:

The Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford

http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/home.htm

Pugwash Study Group on CBW http://fas-www.harvard.edu:80/~hsp/pugwash.html

CBIAC (The Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center)

http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Chemical and Biological Warfare Project

http://www.sipri.se

The Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project

http://www.stimson.org

Biological and Toxin Weapons Working Group, Federation of American Scientists

                http://www.fas.org/bwc/index.html

ASA (Applied Science and Analysis, Inc.) Newsletter http://www.asanltr.com/

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute http://www.cbaci.org/

BACK

Convention on Biological Diversity

Text: http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was established to support the conservation and utilisation of biodiversity ensuring fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the latter.  The CBD assigns sovereign rights to the country of origin and requires that Prior Informed Consent (PIC) is received from the country in which access to organisms is requested.  Mutually Agreed Terms (MAT) on the conditions under which access is granted and on which benefits will be shared should they accrue from the use of the organisms must be put in place.  Benefit sharing may include monetary elements but may also include information, technology transfer and training.  The supply of organisms must also be under agreed terms under Material Transfer Agreements (MTA) between supplier and recipient to ensure benefit sharing with, at least the country of origin.  This is a significant role for public service collections potentially bearing critical responsibilities to ensure traceability. Many culture collections have operated benefit sharing since they began giving organisms in exchange for deposits and re-supplying the depositor with the strain if they require a replacement. An EU DG XII project, Microorganisms Sustainable Use and Access Regulation International Code of Conduct (MOSAICC) (http://www.belspo.be/bccm/mosaicc/) is working toward standard material transfer agreements to facilitate access to genetic resources whilst adhering to the spirit of the CBD and National and International law governing the distribution of microorganisms (Davison et al. 1998).

Many countries are putting in place legislation to control access to their genetic resources.  This normally includes certification processes and can help by identifying the relevant authorities for PIC and help set the terms and conditions of access.  However, some legislation has been bureaucratic and has served to restrict access.  National Focal Points on access and benefit sharing are beginning to appear that should make the process simpler.  To date most collections have adopted a wait and see attitude as their role is still not clear.

Ownership of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR)

Organisms originating from different habitats all over the world are deposited in collections. On deposit the issue of ownership of intellectual property associated with them must be addressed.  The CBD bestows sovereign rights over genetic resources to the country of origin, but intellectual property rights covering their use in processes is another matter.  The CBD requires that the country of origin has a share in benefits accruing from such use, but there may be several other stakeholders. These may include the landowner where the organism was isolated, the collector, those involved in purification and growing the organism, the discoverer of the intellectual property, the collection owner where the organism was preserved and the developer of the process.  It is clear that all stakeholders do not all have an equal stake, this will depend upon the input of each one to the discovery or process.  This has implications for the sharing of benefits arising from exploitation of the genetic resource. The collection has a role to play in the protection of IPR even if it is merely informing the recipient of any existing material transfer agreement or the citation of the strain in a patent. The implementation of the CBD is still being discussed by delegates from the countries who are signatory and who meet at the Conference of the Parties and their workgroups.  Information on the progress of these discussions can be found on the CBD web site (http://www.biodiv.org/).

As a form of protecting IPR patents may be taken out. In many cases the organism involved must be part of the disclosure and many countries either recommend or require by law that a written disclosure of an invention involving the use of organisms be supplemented by the deposit of the organism into a recognised culture collection. Most patent lawyers recommend that the organism is deposited, regardless of it being a requirement, to avoid the possibility of the patent being rejected.  To remove the need for deposit of organisms in a collection in every country where patent protection is desired, the 乬Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purpose of Patent Procedure乭 was concluded in 1977 and came into force towards the end of 1980.  This recognises named culture collections as 乬International Depository Authorities乭 (IDA) and a single deposit made in any one is accepted by every country party to the treaty.   Any collection can become an IDA providing it has been formally nominated by a contracting state and meets certain criteria. There are 29 IDAs around the world and 23 in Europe which accept patent deposits of human and animal cell lines, algae, bacteria, cyanobacteria, fungi, nematodes, non-pathogenic protozoa, plant seeds and yeasts.

It is quite clear that every intermediary in an improvement or development process is entitled to a share of the IPR, which adds another dimension to ownership. Therefore, it is critical that clear procedures on access, mutually agreed terms on fair and equitable sharing of benefits and sound material transfer agreements are in place to protect the interested parties.

Further information: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00253/bibs/1057004/10570443.htm

Safety information provided to the recipient of microorganisms

A safety data sheet must be despatched with organism indicating which hazard group it belongs to and what containment and disposal procedures are necessary.  In the UK , Microorganisms are covered by the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) regulations (1988), HSW Act s.6(4)(c)  and subject Approved Code of Practice Biological Agents 1994.  Article 10 of the EU Directive 90/379/EEC regulates that manufacturers, importers, distributors and suppliers must provide safety data sheets in a prescribed format.   A safety data sheet accompanying a microorganism must include:

· The hazard group of the organism being despatched as defined by EU Directive 90/679/EEC Classification of Biological Agents and by the national variation of this legislation for example, in the UK , as defined in the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) Categorisation of biological agents, 4 edition, and the Approved Code of Practice (ACOP) for Biological Agents.

· A definition of the hazards and assessment of the risks involved in handling the organism.

· Requirements for the safe handling and disposal of the organism.

                                - Containment level

- Opening cultures and ampoules

- Transport

- Disposal

- Procedures in case of spillage

Example safety data sheets

Safety Data Sheets content is described in EU Directive 93/112/EC of 10 December 1993 (OL L314/93) which amends the 91/155/EC. An explanation of the Directive can be found at http://www.vgt.nl/msds/msdsregs.htm.

Summary

In the interests of the progress of science microbiologists must be able to exchange their organisms upon which their hypotheses and results are based but they must do this in a way that presents minimum risk to those who come into contact with the organism.  They must not fall fowl of the laws that control the shipping of microorganisms as this will inevitably result in even more restrictive legislation that will make their exchange impossible.  Health and Safety, packaging and shipping and controlled distribution legislation may be extensive and sometimes cumbersome but is there to protect us and must be followed.


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                EEC Directives 90/220/EEC. Release of GMO's

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Stricoff, R.S. & Walters, D.B. (1995) Handbook of Laboratory Health and Safety, second edition. pp 462.  New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Substances for use at work: the provision of information (1985).  HSE booklet HS(G)27.  London: HMSO. ISBN 0 11 883844 X.

UPU (1998).  Universal Postal Convention, Compendium of Information. Edition of 1 January 1996 - last update 15.06.98.  Berne:  Universal Postal Union, Berne (International Bureau)


Information on the European Biological Resource Centre Network

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The European Biological Resource Centre Network (EBRCN) is a project running under the Quality of Life and Management of Living Resources of the EU Framework 5 Programme due for completion May 2004. The project addresses important issues raised by the current OECD Initiative on Biological Resource Centres (BRCs) requiring collections to adapt to support biosciences for the 21st century.  It will establish a thematic network that will allow Europe to exploit its expertise in BRCs and Information Technology.  It will provide an infrastructure with one gateway to reach quality assured European biological resource centres.  It will allow links to be made between the BRC catalogues and other data sets and ensure that the large amount of specialised information that is presently hidden is made accessible for all to use.  The European Biological Resource Centres Network (EBRCN) will be established with a critical mass of high quality BRCs to act as a focal point for common policy development. It will use the Common Access to Biological Resources and Information (CABRI) database, a recently completed EU demonstration project as its central electronic contact point (http://www.cabri.org) and on which it will base the European 乪virtual乫 BRC.

 

Objectives

1.        Establish a network of biological resource centres initiated with a minimum of 11 living organism collections (ca. 150000 living specimens), holders of nucleic acids, probes etc. and associated data to respond to OECD initiatives in the international environment. 

2.        Develop the European Standard for BRCs based on existing collection quality management systems to be adopted by a minimum of eleven national collections of European states.

3.        Establish a framework to maximise complementarity and minimise unnecessary duplication among European BRCs.

4.        Introduce new techniques in information technology to the EBRCN to add value to current catalogue information and enhance accessibility to 11 catalogue databases and at least one literature and one molecular database.

5.        Collate and disseminate information on legislation on access to, and distribution of, living organisms and health and safety to BRCs and users through a central web site.

It is essential that European public service collections work together to address common problems and become more effective and efficient by sharing tasks and collaborating together to provide a comprehensive service. Collection organisations such as the European Culture Collection Organisation (ECCO) and the World Federation for Culture Collections (WFCC) do not co-ordinate the operations of collections. However, two European countries do have collections co-ordinated on a more integral basis, the Belgian Co-ordinated Collections of Micro-organisms (BCCM) and the UK National Culture Collection (UKNCC).  The EBRCN will enhance such collaboration and extend it European-wide to enable Europe to offer a premier service to its member states and to the world.  The technology now exists for such co-operation.  Web-based interactions between European centres will lead to a Virtual Biological Resource Centre, which will provide the focal point Europe needs to gain the most from its divergent expertise and investments.

The project work is split into 5 work packages, which aim at building the EBRCN platform forming a comprehensive network.  The network will set the European Biological Resource Collection (BRC) Standard.  Common policies will be established to address legislation governing collection activities and services and to co-ordinate activities leading to an effective resource to underpin European Biotechnology.  Finally there is a need to take full advantage of available information technology and ensure that linking to, and from, literature and other relevant biological information databases enhances collection information.

The partner BRCs are currently providing services and products to the scientific community whilst developing mechanisms to improve these and designing new approaches to meet the changing needs of their users.  This project will co-ordinate such processes and increase effectiveness and efficiency.  Research and development will continue in these centres, information will be gathered and data generated to add value to holdings.  Strain property and molecular information will be gathered and stored in databases.  The project will provide the mechanisms for such information to be made available to the scientific community in a user friendly and comprehensive way.  The overall aim is to develop the European 乪virtual乫 Biological Resource Centre that will increase efficiency in partner BRCs and facilitate user access.  The project will offer solutions to critical problems in biotechnology and biodiversity.

Information on microbiologists and law

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Handling and distribution of micro-organisms and the law to disseminate information on our legal responsibilities while collecting and distributing microorganisms (Smith, D. Rohde, C. & Holmes, B.  (1999). Microbiology Today 26, 14-16).  A fuller version of this paper is available on the Society for General Microbiology web site, this will be periodically updated, http://www.socgenmicrobiol.org.uk

Information on COSHH

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The effect of COSHH on Culture Storage and Supply

The COSHH regulations (1988) aim to stimulate and enforce an improvement in Health and Safety in the workplace.  All principles embodied in the COSHH regulations are contained in the UK HSW Act 1974.  COSHH formalises, enforces and in some instances extends certain sections of this act. COSHH requires a suitable and sufficient risk assessment for all work that is liable to expose an employee to any substance that may be hazardous to health.  This UK legislation has equivalents in other countries but in common with all health and safety legislation is not so comprehensive and leaves a lot open to interpretation.

It can be much simpler dealing with a known chemical than with a named microorganism.  The full metabolic and biochemical potential of a microorganism is rarely known and therefore assessing the risk when the hazard is not clearly defined becomes difficult.  This is where the COSHH regulations are realistic leaving room for interpretation.  The regulations incorporate terms `as far as reasonably practicable', `adequate control', and `suitable measures' which enables the employer to set relevant safe procedures that are workable.  Microorganisms present different levels and kinds of hazard and leaving an enormous, but necessary, task for microbiologists.  A risk assessment for example, must take into account the production of potentially hazardous toxins.  In the last analysis a safe laboratory is the result of applying good techniques, a hallmark of technical excellence.  Containment level 2 is easily achievable and should be standard practice in all microbiological laboratories.  Good aseptic techniques applied by well-trained personnel will ensure pure and clean cultures and will minimise contact with the microorganism.  However, the unexpected, the accident, must also be taken into account when assessing the risk involved.  The employment of good laboratory practice, good housekeeping, workplace and equipment maintenance and ensuring that staff have the relevant information and training, will minimise the risk of accidents.  The establishment of emergency procedures to reduce potential harm is an additional and sensible approach.

Information on risk assessment

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Risk assessments are carried out on all microorganisms worked with and held in laboratories. This requires the assignment of each strain to a hazard group including a positive inclusion into hazard group 1 following a thorough risk assessment.  The risk assessment should include an assessment of all hazards involved not just infection but also the production of toxic metabolites and the ability to cause allergic reactions.  Organisms that produce volatile toxins or aerosols of spores or cells present a greater risk.  It is the responsibility of the microbiologist to provide such assessment data to a recipient of a culture to ensure its safe handling and containment. 

Microorganisms are normally classified on their potential to cause disease, their human pathogenicity, into four groups (Anon, 1996a). - ACDP classification BACK to text

Group 1  A biological agent that is most unlikely to cause human disease.

Group 2  A biological agent that may cause human disease and which might be a hazard to                laboratory workers but is unlikely to spread in the community.  Laboratory exposure rarely produces infection and effective prophylaxis or treatment is available.

Group 3  A biological agent that may cause severe human disease and present a serious hazard to   laboratory workers.  It may present a risk of spread in the community but there is usually             effective prophylaxis or treatment.

Group 4  A biological agent that causes severe human disease and is a serious hazard to laboratory                 workers.  It may present a high risk of spread in the community and there is usually no               effective prophylaxis or treatment.

The containment level numbers correlate with the risk group in which the organism falls (i.e. organisms in Risk Group 1 require Containment level 1 and so forth see Table 1 below).

The species of bacteria and fungi falling into hazard groups 2 and 3 are defined (Anon, 1996a, 199b). All bacteria from the approved list have been assigned to an appropriate hazard group in Germany (Anon, 1998).  The sister publication on the fungi has not assigned the species to hazard group 1 (Anon, 1996a, 1996b).  There has been an attempt to categorise medically important fungi to relevant hazard groups by G.S. de Hoog et al. (1996).  To meet the UK and European legislation all microbiologists will have to make a risk assessment on the organisms with which they work or hold in collections.   In the case of fungi it is recognised that many organisms infect following traumatic inoculation through the skin, or infect the compromised patient but do not infect healthy individuals.  Most fungi from clinical specimens require Containment Level 2 (ACDP 1996) unless a higher degree of containment is specified (see table 1).  In the UK Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO's) also require containment level 2 for handling and all potential work with such organisms must first be referred to the Biological Safety Officer and the Biological Safety Committee. Again legislation can be different in other countries for example in Germany some manipulated organisms can be handled at containment level 1.

The COSHH regulations work well and can be easily applied in establishments with designed laboratories but may not work so well in the industrial environment where very large volumes and more hazardous techniques may be used.  Total containment is rarely applicable.

Assessment of microorganisms

Microorganisms are more difficult to name, less predictable and more difficult to enumerate or measure than chemicals.  Virulence and toxicity may vary from strain to strain.  In addition to the risk of infection other hazards exist, such as mycotoxin production, allergenicity.

Information on containment levels – Back to text

Table 2  Summary of laboratory containment levels for the UK (Anon 1996a)

CONTAINMENT REQUIREMENT

CONTAINMENT LEVEL

 

1

2

3

4

 

Laboratory site: isolation

No

No

Partial

Yes

 

Laboratory: sealable for fumigation

No

No

Yes

Yes

 

Ventilation: inward airflow/negative pressure

Ventilation: through safety cabinet

mechanical: direct

mechanical: independent ducting

Optional

No

No

No

Optional

Optional

No

No

Yes

Optional

Optional

Optional

Yes

No

No

Yes

 

Airlock

Airlock: with shower

No

No

No

No

Optional

No

Yes

No

 

Wash hand basin

Optional

Yes

Yes

Yes

 

Effluent treatment

No

No

No

Yes

 

Autoclave site:    on site                                                          in suite                                                        in lab: free standing                                  in lab: double ended

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Optional

No

No

No

No

Yes

 

Microbiological safety cabinet/enclosure

Class of cabinet/enclosure*

No

-

Optional

Class I

Yes

Class I/III

Yes

Class I/III

 

*    Guidance on the use of Class II microbiological safety cabinets is given in the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens Report (1996).

To meet COSHH requirements a step by step evaluation of a laboratory procedure or an industrial process must be carried out.  This is necessary as different organisms provide different hazards and different size inocula are required to cause a problem.   The assessment must cover the procedure from the original inoculum or seed culture to the final product or the point where the organism is killed and disposed of.  It is not adequate to say that the microorganism is of ACDP hazard group 2 or less and therefore work can be carried out on the laboratory bench apart from those procedures that may create aerosols.  Some individuals may respond differently to exposure, being more sensitive than others are.  It is therefore critical that the full potential of organisms is taken into account and this related to the effect they may have on the particular individual carrying out the work.

Microbial toxins

Information on mycotoxin production - BACK to text

One of the better known hazards associated with fungi is the ability to produce toxic secondary metabolites.  The presence of these in culture media adds to the hazard status of the growing organisms.  The toxins produced may be carcinogenic, nephrotoxic, hepatotoxic, haemorrhagic, oestrogenic or cause inflammatory effects.  The most commonly known is aflatoxin which is considered to be carcinogenic, hepatotoxic and potentially mutagenic and is produced by strains of Aspergillus flavus and A. parasiticus.  Table 2 lists some mycotoxins that may be present in growth media and present additional problems in both use and disposal.

Mycotoxicoses are poisonings caused by the ingestion of food contaminated (and sometimes rendered carcinogenic) by toxin producing microfungi.  Toxins are also produced by many other fungi for example citreoviridin, citrinin, islanditoxin  and patulin  by species of Penicillium, ochratoxin by Aspergillus and trichothecenes and zearelenone by species of Fusarium, and various other compounds including cochliodinol by Chaetomium.  It should always be remembered that many fungi have not been studied chemically and because mycotoxins are not reported for a species does not mean it does not produce them.  The handling of materials contaminated by these toxins can lead to their ingestion and subsequent poisoning.  Inhalation of mycotoxins can also be dangerous.  Toxins from Aspergillus and Fusarium species have caused problems in patients when inhaled.  The death of 2 factory workers from liver disease was associated with the inhalation of dust containing aflatoxin.


Table 3  Some common mycotoxins and examples of fungi producing them.

                Mycotoxin                                             Organisms

                Aflatoxin                                             Aspergillus flavus, A. parasiticus
                Aflatrem                                              Aspergillus flavus
                Altenuic acid                                        Alternaria alternata
                Alternariol                                               Alternaria alternata
                Austdiol                                               Aspergillus ustus
                Austamide                                                Aspergillus ustus
                Austocystin                                          Aspergillus ustus
                Bentenolide                                          Monographella nivalis
                Brevianamide                                       Aspergillus ustus
                Citrinin                                            Aspergillus carneus, A. terreus, Penicillium citrinum, P. hirsutum, P. verrucosum
                Citreoviridin                                        Aspergillus terreus, Penicillium citreoviride
                Cochliodinol                                        Chaetomium cochliodes
                Crotocin                                              Acremonium crotocinigenum
                Cytochalasin E                                     Aspergillus clavatus
                Cyclopiazonic acid                               Aspergillus versicolor
                Destruxin B                                          Aspergillus ochraceus
                Fumagilin                                             Aspergillus fumigatus
                Fusarin                                                 Fusarium moniliforme
                Gliotoxin                                             Aspergillus fumigatus
                Islanditoxin                                          Penicillium islandicum
                Malformin                                               Aspergillus niger
                Maltoryzine                                         Aspergillus spp.
                Moniliformin                                       Fusarium moniliforme, F. oxysporum, F. equiseti
                Ochratoxin                                              Aspergillus ochraceus, Penicillium viridictum
                Oxalic acid                                           Aspergillus niger
                Patulin                                                 Aspergillus clavatus, Penicillium expansum,
                                                                            P. roquefortii, P. claviforme, P. griseofulvum

                Penicillic acid                                       Aspergillus ochraceus
                Penitrem                                              Penicillium crustosum
                Roridin                                                 Myrothecium roridum, M. verrucaria
                                                                            Dendrodochium spp., Cylindrocarpon spp.,
                                                                            Stachybotrys spp.
                Rubratoxin                                               Penicillium rubrum
                Rubroskyrin                                         Penicillium spp.
                Rubrosulphin                                        Penicillium viridicatum
                Rugulosin                                             Penicillium brunneum, P. kloeckeri,
                                                                            P. rugulosum

                Satratoxin                                                Stachybotrys chartarum
                Slaframine                                                Rhizoctonia leguminicola
                Sterigmatocystin                                  Aspergillus flavus, A. nidulans, A. versicolor,
                                                                            Penicillium rugulosum
                Trichodermin                                       Trichoderma viride
                Trichothecin                                        Trichothecium roseum

                Trichothecenes                                    Fusarium acuminatum, F. roseum, F. sporotrichioides
                                T2 toxin
                                deoxynivalenol (vomitoxin)
                                nivalenol
                                diacetoxyscirpenol
                                fusarenone
                                3-acetyldeoynivalenol
                                15-acetyldexoynivalenol
                Tryptoquivalene                                  Aspergillus clavatus
                Verrucarin                                                Myrothecium verrucaria, Dendrodochium spp.
                Verruculogen                                        Aspergillus fumigatus
                Viopurpurin                                          Trichophyton spp., Penicillium viridicatum
                Viomellein                                                                                            Aspergillus spp., Penicillium aurantiogriseum, P. crustosum, P. viridicatum
                Viriditoxin                                               Aspergillus fumigatus
                Xanthocillin                                         Eurotium chevalieri
                Zearalenone                                         Fusarium culmorum, F. graminearum, F. oxysporum, F. roseum

Data from IMI database and Smith & Moss (1985).

Microbial toxins

Information on bacterial toxinsBACK to text

As infection patterns caused by bacterial pathogens are so different and depend on the bacterial pathogen and the individual host, every infection is an extremely individual process.

Diseases caused by bacteria may be grouped as follows (乬Sichere Biotechnologie, Eingruppierung biologischer Agenzien: Bakterien乭.  Merkblatt B006, 1998, BG Chemie):

-          Local infections.

Manifestation of the pathogen in a localised tissue.

Examples: Staphylococcus aureus, Neisseria gonorrhoeae.

-          Local infections with production of a potent toxin.

Low invasiveness as above, but general diffusion of the toxin via the lymphatic and blood stream.

Examples: Clostridium tetani, Corynebacterium diptheriae.

-          Acute generalised infections.

Usually highly invasive distribution of the pathogens after infection leading to possible septic-toxic shock.  Sometimes tissue specific (organotrop) manifestation, examples: plague, typhus, brucellosis, some types of tuberculosis.

The virulence of strains of pathogenic bacterial species is determined by their invasiveness, their production of aggressins and toxigenicity.  The characteristics of most of the bacterial toxins are 1) they are capable of damaging or killing normal host cells and 2) they are effective upon infection.  In contrast to the latter, most of the mycotoxins are effective without needing the process of infection.  The role played by bacterial invasiveness in damaging the host varies widely: sometimes infection can be extremely localised (e.g. Corynebacterium diphtheriae), the toxin diffuses and reaches virtually all tissues.  Alternatively, pathogens must invade and multiply producing large numbers to generate enough toxin to cause damage to the host (e.g. Bacillus anthraacis).  Two classes of bacterial toxins have been designated which can be distinguished by their chemical nature: protein-like exotoxins (examples are diphtheria, tetanus, botulinus toxins and enterotoxins) and endotoxins which are molecular complexes containing protein, lipid and polysaccharude componants.  Endotoxins are in the main relatively non-specific, are derived from the outer layers of cell walls of gram-negative bacteria and released after bacterial lysis.  Cells of nearly all gram-negative pathogenic bacteria are intrinsically toxic.  The best known endotoxins exhibiting pyrogenicity and toxicity are those of the enteric bacteria of the genera Escherichia, Salmonella and Shigella.  Endotoxins are also inflammatory agents increasing capillary permeability.

Aggressins are enzyme-like substances e.g. proteases, collagenases, lipases, phospholipases or neuraminidases which usually support the invasion of a pathogen by damaging host tissue. 

A complete list of all known bacterial toxins cannot be given here, examples of toxin producers can be found in Annexe III, Community Classification of the EU Directive 90/679/EEC.  In addition to those bacteria strains that produce toxins in the process of infection there are non-infectious toxin producers.  The most important group of these is the Cyanobacteria of which there are ca. 2000 species and are currently considered as hazard group 1. Further information can be found in Collier et al. 1998.


Table 4  Some bacterial exotoxins and examples of bacteria producing them (based on Stanier R.Y., Ingraham, J.L., Wheelis, M.L. & Painter, P.R. (eds) (1997) General Microbiology, 5th edition)

Toxin

Bacterium

Neurotoxins

 

Botulinum toxins: A, B, C1, C2, D, E, F, G

Clostridium botulinum

Tetanospasmin

Clostridium tetani

Tetanolysin

 

Cytotoxins

 

a lecithinase

Clostridium perfringens

Necrotic factors

 

Hemolysin

 

Collagenase

 

Diphtheria toxin

Corynebacterium diphtheriae

Streptolysin O

Streptococcus pyrogenes

Streptolysin S

 

Enterotoxins

 

Enterotoxin

Clostridium perfringens

a toxin

Staphylococcus aureus

乬Enterotoxin乭

 

Shiga toxin

Shigella dysenteriae

Cholera toxin

Vibrio cholerae

乬Guinea pig toxin乭

Yersinia pestis

Heat-labile enterotoxin (LT)

Escherichia coli

Heat-stable enterotoxin (ST)

Escherichia coli

Quarantine regulations

UK contacts – BACK to text

National

Clients in the UK who wish to obtain cultures of non-indigenous plant pathogens must first obtain a MAFF license. Under the terms of such a licence the shipper is required to see a copy of the Ministry permit before such strains can be supplied.  Such licences are available in England and Wales from Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Room 340, Foss House, Kings Pool, 1-2 Peace Holme Green, York YO1 2PX and in Scotland from Plant Health Section, Agricultural Science Agency, East Craigs, Edinburgh EH12 8NJ. 

Non-indigenous tree pathogens can only be supplied if the customer holds a current permit issued by The Forestry Commission:  Forestry Commission Headquarters, 231 Corsthorphine Road, Edinburgh EH12 7AP. 

Canada contacts – BACK to text

All shipments to Canada for plant pathogens must be accompanied by import mailing labels, without which entry of cultures to these countries is refused.  Applications for these labels, stating the names of the organisms and the purpose for which they are required, should be made to the Chief of the Plant Protection Division, Agriculture Canada' Science Division, Science Service Building, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada  K1AS.

USA contacts – BACK to text

All shipments to the USA for plant pathogens must be accompanied by import mailing labels, without which entry of cultures to these countries is refused.  Applications for these labels, stating the names of the organisms and the purpose for which they are required, should be made to USDA Agricultural Research Service, Plant Protection & Quarantine, Room 764, 6505 Belcrest Road, Hyattsville, Marylands  20782, USA .

Packaging classes – BACK to text

Class 1. Agents of no recognised hazard under ordinary conditions of handling.  Unrestricted distribution for bona fide teaching, research industry, etc.

Class 2. Agents of ordinary potential hazard.  Distribution is restricted to professional investigators (includes Trichophyton rubrum).

Class 3.  Pathogens involving special hazard.  Distribution is restricted to professional investigators.

Class 4. Agents of potential danger to the public health, animal health or of hazard to laboratory personnel requiring special facilities for their containment.  Distribution by permit, this includes Fusarium moniliforme.

Information on packaging

The DSMZ has collected all relevant guidelines for the shipping of microorganisms and updated it on a regular basis (Anon, 1998) this will also be available shortly on the DSMZ web-site (http://www.gbf.de/dsmz/shipping/shipping.htm).

BACK to text

Information on transport of goods by road– BACK to text

In Europe class 6.2 Dangerous Goods are transported by road packed according to EN 829 requirements.  Transport by road is regulated by the Accord Européen relatif au transport international des merchandises dangereuses par routes (ADR).  This clearly separates class 6.2 into two subclasses, A: highly infectious material (hazard groups 3 and 4) and B: other infectious material.  These two groups A and B, have different packaging requirements, however, currently there are no manufacturers producing these different shipping containers therefore the UN specification containers for class 6.2 materials must be used for both subclasses.  The EU have made an attempt to co-ordinate Member State laws on transport of dangerous goods by road with the 乪ADR-Directive乫 EC Council Directive 94/55/EC of 21 November 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member states on the transport of dangerous goods by road (EC, 1994, 1996). There is an  exemption for diagnostic specimens travelling on the road in or between Germany , UK and Tchech Rep. where the M96 applies (a multilateral agreement where even diagnostic specimens with the possibility of containing RG 3 can be sent under EN 829).

Information on postal regulations

The UK Post Office leaflet on "Infectious and non-infectious perishable biological substances in the overseas post" is available from The Post Office, Corporate Headquarters, 30 St James Square, London SW1 4PY.  Tel: +44 171 490 2888; Fax: +44 181 681 9387 and provides the relevant information. Some countries will not accept human pathogens through the post.  A list, which changes from time to time, of these countries can also be obtained from the Post Office (also see Anon, 1998; Smith, 1996).

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Information on distribution

For further details see Packaging and Shipping of Biological Materials at ATCC (Alexander & Brandon, 1986) and Shipping of infectious, non-infectious and genetically modified biological materials, International Regulations DSMZ-Deutsche Sammlung von Mikroorganismen und Zellkulturen GmbH, Braunschweig, Germany (1998), IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations (Anon, 1998).

Canadian shipping regulations change

Although this new version of the regulations is not perfect, it is far more user friendly and a vast improvement over the old one. How clear these new regulations are is a matter of individual opinion.

For those who have been in compliance with the old TDGR and ship Class 6.2Infectious Substances within Canada and internationally, the changes are not dramatic. There have been some very subtle rewordings throughout but in most cases the spirit remains the same. Here is a quick review of the newregulations as they pertain to shippers of Class 6.2.

    a.. A change that affects all those who ship Dangerous Goods by air is the length of training validity. Prior to August 15th, training for shipping by air was valid for 1 year and after that time, recurrent training was required. As of the 15th of August, the validity stretched to two years.1For shipping by ground, training validity remains the same at three years.

    b.. Another change, that affects only a small number of infectious shippers, is the need for a Class 6 placard on any vehicle transporting Risk Group 4 organisms.2 An Emergency Response Assistance Program (ERAP) is also required for Risk Group 4 shipments.3

    c.. The definitions for Dangerous Goods, infectious substances, diagnostic specimens, biological products, and genetically modified organisms have been rewritten for clarification. When compared with the definitions in the current regulations, they are virtually the same.

    d.. In Parts 1.39 and 1.40 of the new Clear Language regulations, Risk Group 2 and 3 Exemptions are outlined. Part 1.39 suggests that these regulations do not apply (our emphasis) to infectious substances included in Risk Group 2 other than to a list of 8 found in subsection 2 of the part if they are contained in a means of containment required or permitted by Part 5, Means of Containment. Translation. The regulations do apply to these 8 but not to other all other Risk Group 2 infectious substances. Part 1.40 includes a list of 6 Risk group 3 infectious substances to which the regulations do not apply if they are contained in a means of containmentrequired or permitted by Part 5, Means of Containment. Translation. The regulations do apply to all other Risk group 3 infectious substances except these 6. This seems to mean that, if you follow the regulations in relation to packaging, certain specimens are not subject to the regulations. Clear on that? Remember however that when shipping by air, the International Air Transport Association Dangerous Goods Regulations do not allow for these exemptions and all RG 2 and 3 organisms must be classified as Dangerous Goods. Most courier companies and airlines, large and small, are affiliated with IATA and abide by their DGR.

    e.. The domestic and international transport by aircraft of infectious substances is fully covered in Part 12 of the new regulations. This part requires that consignments of Dangerous Goods offered for transport and transported by aircraft to be done in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO TI). Since the requirements of the IATA DGR are analogous with the ICAO TI, shippers should refer to the IATA DGR to properly prepare their shipments.

    f.. Means of containment (read proper packaging) is covered in Part 5. The combinations of container type, Risk Group sublists and exceptions are too numerous to cover here. Suffice to say that all shipments considered to be infectious must be prepared according to IATA Packing Instruction 602 (1A type packaging) and that diagnostic specimens being sent for initial our routine screening (for other than the presence of pathogens) be packaged according to Packing Instruction 650 (1B type packaging).**

    g.. Both package marking and labeling remain basically the same. On the Shipper's Declaration of Dangerous Goods, IATA does not require a risk group indication in the technical name area, however shipments originating in Canada should include the Risk Group along with the technical name.

    h.. There are longer three divisions of class 9 Dangerous Goods. The new regulations cover Miscellaneous Products, Substances or Organisms. Dry ice and certain Genetically Modified Organisms fall under Class 9.4 Does a shipper of Class 6.2 Dangerous Goods needs retraining as of August 15th? Part 6.5 of the new regulations states "A person's training should be up-to-date with these regulations . . ." Note that this statement is in italics. Part 1.3(1) reads "Anything written in italics in these Regulations is not part of the Regulations."

One thing is perfectly clear. If you're not now abiding by the new regulations, there is a Transport Canada Inspector out there who would like to have a word with you.

1 Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations Clear Language Edition Part 6

2 Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations Clear Language Edition Part 4

3 Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations Clear Language Edition Part 7

4 Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations Clear Language Edition Part 2

*The new regulations can be found at http://www.tc.gc.ca/TDG/regulations.htm

**Means of containment selection can be found in a table in Part 5.16

The basis for all regulations governing the safe transport of goods for all carriers are laid down in the Orange Book, Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (Anon, 1997d). 

BACK to text

Definitions

Definition of NPBS - Non-infectious Perishable Biological Substances are substances which contain viable microorganisms known not to cause disease in animals or humans based upon World Health Organisation (WHO) classification.  Only organisms of Hazard Group 1 are considered to be in this category.  BACK to text

Definition of IPBS - Infectious, Perishable Biological Substances are substances known to contain or reasonably expected to contain pathogens (including for example bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi). These are viable microorganisms known to cause disease in animals or humans based upon World Health Organisation (WHO) classification. Organisms of Hazard Group 2, 3 or 4 are considered to be in this category.  BACK to text

Definition of select agent

These are agents capable of causing substantial harm to human or animal health or the environment

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Information on patents

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The general principles of international patent law require that details of an invention must be fully disclosed to the public. Inventions that utilise living organisms present problems of disclosure as a patented process often cannot be tested following the publication of a written description alone. The European and US Patent Offices recognise that organisms are patentable in their natural state under certain conditions e.g. when they have been isolated by a specific procedure or if they can do something novel, new species are discoveries not inventions. Genetically manipulated micro-organisms are usually considered as a human invention and are patentable. If a process involving an organism has novelty, inventiveness, utility or application and sufficient disclosure it can be subject to patent (Kelley & Smith, 1997). The invention of a product, a process of manufacture or a new use for a known product is an intellectual property owned by the inventor whether it involves an organism or not.

Information on the Budapest Treaty

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The Budapest Treaty provides an internationally uniform system of deposit and lays down the procedures which depositor and depository must follow, the duration of deposit and the mechanisms for the release of samples.  Thirty-six states and the European Patent Office are now party to the Budapest Treaty. http://www.cnpat.com/worldlaw/treaty/budapest_en.htm

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) http://www.wipo.org/ publishes data on the numbers of micro-organisms deposited in collections under the terms of the Budapest Treaty (1977).  Since the treaty乫s inception, there were 24 712 deposits up to December 1994 (Anon, 1996c).  Patent protection is covered in Article 16 of the CBD under which parties must co-operate. However, this is subject to national legislation and international law, to ensure patents and other intellectual property rights are supportive of, and do not contravene, the objectives of the Convention (Fritze, 1994).  This remains an area of dispute as the article leaves open the possibility that the CBD takes priority over national patent law.  Patent law and the CBD are generally compatible but can conflict in cases where exploitation may endanger the resource.  In many cases where organisms are grown artificially there is no threat to the existence of the species.  Details of the requirements for a collection that relate to the deposit of an organism can be obtained directly from IDA collections and are summarised by Kelley & Smith (1997).


List of dangerous organisms - subject to restricted access  BACK to text

HUMAN AND ANIMAL PATHOGENS

       

Viruses, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows:

       

ARENAVIRIDAE:

       
 

Flexal

 

H

   
 

Guanarito

 

H*

   
 

Junin

A

     
 

Lassa fever

A

     
 

Lymphocytic choriomeningitis

A

     
 

Machupo

A

     
 

Mopeia

 

H

   
 

Sabia

 

H*

   

BUNYAVIRIDAE

       
 

Akabane

 

H

   
 

Germiston

 

H

   
 

Oropouche

 

H

   

Hantaviruses

       
 

Belgrade (Dobrova)

 

H

   
 

Hantaan (Korean haemorrhagic fever)

A

     
 

Sin Nombre (formerly Muerto Canyon)

 

H

   
 

Seoul

 

H

   

Nairoviruses

       
 

Bhanja

 

H

   
 

Crimean/Congo haemorrhagic fever

A

     

Phleboviruses

       
 

Rift valley fever

A

 

M1

 

CALICIVIRIDAE

       
 

hepatitis E

 

H

   

FILOVIRIDAE

       
 

Ebola

A

     
 

Marburg

A

     

FLAVIVIRIDAE

       

Flaviviruses

       
 

Dengue viruses types 1-4

A

     
 

Hepatitis G

 

H

   
 

Israel turkey meningitis

 

H

   
 

Japanese B encephalitis

A

     
 

Kyasanur forest disease

 

H*

   
 

Murray Valley encephalitis

 

H

   
 

Omsk

 

H*

   
 

Rocio

 

H

   
 

Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus

(tick borne encephalitis)

A

     
 

Sal Vieja

 

H

   
 

San Perlita

 

H

   
 

Spondweni

 

H

   
 

St Louis encephalitis

 

H

   
 

Yellow fever

A

     
 

Wesselsbron

 

H

   
 

West Nile fever

 

H

   
         
   

page 5 of 10

Tick-borne virus group:

       
 

Absettarov

 

H

   
 

Hanzalova

 

H

   
 

Hypr

 

H

   
 

Kumlinge

 

H

   
 

Louping ill

 

H

   
 

Negishi

 

H

   
 

Powassan

 

H

   

Hepatitis C group viruses

 

H

   
 

Hepatitis C

 

H

   

HEPADNAVIRIDAE

 

H

   
 

Hepatitis B

 

H

   

HEPATITIS D (DELTA)

 

H

   

HERPESVIRIDAE

 

H

   
 

Herpesvirus simiae (B virus)

 

H*

   

POXVIRIDAE

 

H

   
 

monkeypox

 

H

   
 

white pox

A

     
 

all strains of variola (major & minor)

 

H*

   

RETROVIRIDAE

 

H

   
 

Human immunodeficiency viruses

 

H

   
 

Human T-cell lymphotrophic viruses (HTLV) types 1 and 2

 

H

   
 

Simian immunodeficiency virus

 

H

   

RHABDOVIRIDAE

 

H

   
 

Rabies

 

H

M1

 
 

Piry

 

H

   

TOGAVIRIDAE

 

H

   

Alphaviruses

 

H

   
 

Chikungunya

A

     
 

Eastern equine encephalomyelitis

A

 

M1

 
 

Everglades

 

H

   
 

Getah

 

H

   
 

Mayaro

 

H

   
 

Middleburg

 

H

   
 

Mucambo

 

H

   
 

Ndumu

 

H

   
 

Sagiyama

 

H

   
 

Tonate

 

H

   
 

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis

A

 

M1

 
 

Western equine encephalamyelitis

A

 

M1

 

UNCLASSIFIED VIRUSES

 

H

   
 

hepatitis viruses not yet identified

 

H

   
 

Equine morbillivirus

 

H*

   

UNCONVENTIONAL AGENTS

       

associated with:

       
 

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and related animal TSE乫s

 

H

   
 

Creutzfelt-Jacob disease

 

H

   
 

Variant Creutzfelt-Jacob disease

 

H

   
 

Fatal familial insomnia

 

H

   
 

Gerstmann-Straussler- Scheinker syndrome

 

H

   
 

Kuru

 

H

   

Bacteria, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

       

Bacillus anthracis

A

 

M1

 

Brucella abortus

A

 

M1

 

Brucella canis

 

H

   
   

page 6 of 10

Brucella melitensis

A

 

M1

 

Brucella ovis

   

M1

 

Brucella suis

A

 

M1

 

Burkholderia mallei

(Pseudomonas mallei)

A

     

Burkholderia pseudomallei

(Pseudomonas pseudomallei)

A

 

M1

 

Chlamydia psittaci

A

     

Clostridium botulinum

A

     

Clostridium perfringens

 

H

   

Clostridium tetani

 

H

   

Cowdria ruminatum

   

M1

 

Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli serotype 0157 and other vero toxin producing strains

 

H

   

Francisella tularensis

A

     

Legionella pneumophilia

       

Mycobacterium africanum

 

H

   

Mycobacterium avium/intracellulare

 

H

   

Mycobacterium bovis

 

H

   

Mycobacterium kansasii

 

H

   

Mycobacterium leprae

 

H

   

Mycobacterium malmoense

 

H

   

Mycobacterium microti

 

H

   

Mycobacterium scrofulaceum

 

H

   

Mycobacterium simiae

 

H

   

Mycobacterium szulgali

 

H

   

Mycobacterium tuberculosis

 

H

   

Mycobacterium ulcerans

 

H

   

Mycobacterium xenopi

 

H

   

Mycoplasma agalactiae

   

M1

 

Mycoplasma caviae

 

H

   

Mycoplasma mycoides

A

     

Mycoplasma mycoides sub species mycoides SC variant

A

 

M1

 

Mycoplasma mycoides sub species mycoides LC variant

A

 

M1

 

Mycoplasma mycoides var capri

A

 

M1

 

Mycoplasma capricolum sub species capripneumoniae

   

M1

 

Salmonella paratyphi A,B,C

 

H

   

Salmonella typhi

A

     

Shigella dysenteriae

A

     

Staphylococcus aureus strains resistant to methicillin

 

H

   

Vibrio cholerae

A

     

Yersinia pestis

A

     

Yersinia pseudotuberculosis

 

H

   

Toxins as follows

       

Botulinum toxin

A

     

Clostridium perfringens toxin

A

     

Conotoxin

A

     

Ricin

A

     

Saxitoxin

A

     

Shiga toxin

A

     

Staphylococcus aureus toxin

A

     

Tetrodoxin

A

     

Verotoxin

A

     

Microcystin (Cyanginosin)

A

     
         

Rickettsiae, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

       
   

page 7 of 10

Coxiella burnetii

A

     

Ehrlichia sennetsu

(Rickettsia sennetsu)

 

H

   

Ehrlichia spp.

 

H

   

Rickettsia akari

 

H

   

Rickettsia canada

 

H

   

Rickettsia conorii

 

H

   

Rickettsia montana

 

H

   

Rickettsia prowazekii

A

     

Rickettsia quintana

A

     

Rickettsia rickettsii

A

     

Rickettsia tsutsugamushi

 

H

   

Rickettsia typhi (Rickettsia mooseri)

 

H

   

Rickettsia spp.

 

H

   

Parasites and other organisms

       

Babesia bovis

   

M1

 

Babesia bigemina

   

M1

 

Babesia caballi

   

M1

 

Babesia equi

   

M1

 

Echinococcus granulosus

 

H

M1

 

Echinococcus multilocularis

 

H

M1

 

Echinococcus vogeli

 

H

   

Leishmania braziliensis

 

H

   

Leishmania donovani

 

H

   

Naegleria fowleri

 

H

   

Plasmodium falciparum

 

H

   

Taenia solium

 

H

   

Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense

 

H

   

Theileria annulata

   

M1

 

Theileria parva

   

M1

 

Trichinella spiralis

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma congolense

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma equiperdum

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma evansi

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma simiae

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma vivax

   

M1

 

Trypanosoma cruzi

 

H

   

Fungi

       

Blastomyces dematitidis

(Ajellomyces dermatitidis)

 

H

   

Cladophialophora bantiana

 

H

   

Coccidioides immitis

 

H

   

Histoplasma capsulatum var capsulatum

(Ajellomyces capsulatus)

 

H

   

Histoplasma capsulatum var duboisii

 

H

   

Histoplasma capsulatum var farciminosum

 

H

   

Histoplasma farciminosum

   

M1

 

Paracoccidioides brasiliensis

 

H

   

Penicillium marneffei

 

H

   

Genetically-modified 乬microorganisms乭 as follows:

(b)     Genetically modified organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms covered by the Australia Group regulations;

b Genetically modified 乬microorganisms乭 or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins specified in the toxins section.

A

A

     
   

page 8 of 10

ANIMAL PATHOGENS, as follows

       

Viruses, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

       

African horse sickness virus

   

M1

 

African swine fever virus

A

 

M1

 

Avian influenza viruses ,which are

a uncharacterised;or

b defined in EC directive 92/40/EC as having high pathogenicity, as follows:

(b)     Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2 or

2. Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin;

A

 

M1

 

Bluetongue virus

A

 

M1

 

Foot & Mouth disease virus

A

 

M1

 

Goat pox virus

A

     

Porcine herpes virus (Aujesky乫s disease)

A

 

M1

 

Swine fever virus

A

     

Lyssa virus

A

 

M1

 

All other species of the genus Lyssavirus

   

M1

 

Newcastle disease virus

A

     

Newcastle disease virus (avian paramyxovirus type 1) which are

(b)     uncharacterised; or

(b) have an intracerebral pathogenicity index in one day old chicks of 0.4 or more, when not less than 10 million 50% egg infectious doses (EID 50) are administered to each bird in the test.

A

 

M1

 

Peste des petits ruminants virus

A

 

M1

 

Porcine enterovirus type 9

A

     

Rinderpest virus

A

 

M1

 

Sheep pox virus

A

     

Teschen disease virus

A

     

Vesicular stomatitis virus

A

     

Bovine leukosis virus

   

M1

 

Classical swine fever virus

   

M1

 

Equine infectious anaemia virus

   

M1

 

Equine mobillivirus

   

M1

 

Japanese encephalitis virus

   

M1

 

Lumpy skin disease virus

   

M1

 

Swine vesicular disease

   

M1

 
         

PLANT PATHOGENS, as follows:

       

Bacteria, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

       

Xanthomonas albilineans

A

     

Xanthomonas campestris pv. Citri including strains referred to as Xanthomonas campestris pv citri types A,B,C,D,E or otherwise classified as Xanthomonas citri, Xanthomonas campestris pv aurantifolia or Xanthomonas campestris pv citrumelo

A

     

Xyella fastidiosa

   

M2

 

Clavibacter michiganensiss

   

M2

 

   

page 9 of 10

Burkholderia solanacearum

(Pseudomonas solanacearum)

   

M2

 

Elm phloem necrosis mycoplasma

   

M2

 

Apple proliferation  mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Apricot chlorotic leafroll mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Pear decline mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Peach rosette mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Peach X-disease mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Peach yellows mcoplasm

   

M2

 

Strawberry witches broom mycoplasm

   

M2

 

Fungi, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

       

Colleotrichum coffeanum var virulans

A

     

Cochliobolus miyabeanus

(Helminthosporium oryzae)

(Drechslera oryzae)

A

     

Microcyclus ulei (syn Dothidella ulei, Melanopsammopsis ulei))

A

     

Puccinia graminis (syn. Puccinia graminis f. sp. tritci)

A

     

Puccinia striiformis (syn Puccinia glumarum)

A

     

Magnaporthe grisea/Pyricularia oryzae)

A

     

Ceratocystis fagacearum

   

M2

 

Chrysomyxa aretostaphyll

   

M2

 

Cronartium spp

   

M2

 

Endocronartium spp

   

M2

 

Guignardia laricina

   

M2

 

Gymnosporangium spp

   

M2

 

Inonotus wetrii

   

M2

 

Melampsora farlowii

   

M2

 

Monilinia fructicola

   

M2

 

Mycosphaerella larici-leptolepsis

   

M2

 

Mycosphaerella poplulorum

   

M2

 

Phoma andina

   

M2

 

Phyllosticta solitaria

   

M2

 

Septoria lycopersici var malagutii

   

M2

 

Thecaphora solani

   

M2

 

Tilletia indica

   

M2

 

Trechispora brinkmannii

   

M2

 

Melampsora medusae

   

M2

 

Synchytrium endobioticum

   

M2

 

viruses

       

Potato viruses and virus like organisms such as:

       
 

Andean potato latent virus

(Potato Andean latent tymovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Andean potato mottle virus

(Potato Andean mottle comovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Arracacha virus B, oca strain

(Arracha B nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Potato black ringspot virus

(Potato black ringspot nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Potato spindle tuber viroid

(Tomato bunchy top virus)

   

M2

 
 

Potato virus T

(Potato T trichovirus)

   

M2

 
 

non-European isolates of potato viruses A,M.S,V,X and Y and potato leaf roll virus

(Potato A potyvirus)

(Potato M carlavirus)

   

M2

 
     

10 of 10

 

(Potato S carlavirus)

(Potato V potyvirus)

(Potato X potexvirus)

(Potato Y potyvirus)

(Potato leafroll luteovirus)

       

Tobacco ringspot virus

(Tobacco ringspot nepovirus)

   

M2

 

Tomato ringspot virus

(Tomato ringspot nepovirus)

(Peach mosaic virus (American)

(Peach yellow bud mosaic virus)

   

M2

 

Viruses and virus-like organisms of Cydonia Mill, Fragaria L, Malus Mill, Prunus L, Pyrus L, Ribes L, Rubus L. and Vitis L such as

   

M2

 
 

Blueberry leaf mottle virus

(Blueberry leaf mottle nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Cherry rasp leaf virus (American)

(Cherry rasp leaf nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Peach mosaic virus (American)

(Peach yellow bud mosaic virus)

(Tomato ringspot virus)

(Tomato ringspot nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Peach rosette mosaic virus

(Peach rosette mosaic nepovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Plum line pattern virus (American)

(Plum American line pattern ilarvirus)

   

M2

 
 

Rasberry leaf curl virus (American)

(Rasberry leaf curl luteovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Strawberry latent 乪C乫 virus

(Strawberry latent 乪C乫 rhabdovirus)

   

M2

 
 

Strawberry vein banding virus

(Strawberry vein banding caulimovirus)

   

M2

 

Non-European viruses and virus like organsims of Cydonia Mill, Fragaria L, Malus Mill, Prunus L, Pyrus L, Ribes L, Rubus L, and Vitis L

   

M2

 

Viruses transmitted by Bemisia tabaci such as:

       
 

Bean golden mosaic virus

(Bean golden mosaic bigeminivirus)

   

M2

 
 

Cowpea mild mottle virus

(Cowpea mild mottle carlavirus)

   

M2

 
 

Lettuce infectious yellow virus

(Lettuce infectious yellow clostervirus)

   

M2

 
 

Pepper mild tigre virus

(Pepper mild tigre bigeminivirus)

   

M2

 
 

Squash leaf curl virus

(Squash leaf curl bigeminivirus)

   

M2

 
 

Euphorbia mosaic virus

(Euphorbia mosaic bigeminivirus)

   

M2

 
 

Florida tomato virus

   

M2

 

Beet necrotic yellow vein virus

   

M2

 

This table was last revised 14 August 1998.

KEY TO ANNEX 1

A             refers to hazardous organisms, including ACDP category 3 & 4 pathogens, included in the 'Australia Group乫 regulations organisms

H             refers to other hazardous organisms, including ACDP category 3& 4 pathogens, not included in the Australia Group regulations.

H*           refers to ACDP category 4 pathogens not included in the Australia Group regulations.

M1          refers to animal pathogens regulated by MAFF

M2          refers to plant pathogens regulated by MAFF                               BACK to text

Safety data sheets

4.8          Safety data sheets despatched with strains from CABI Bioscience UK Centre (Egham)

a.  To accompany organisms not assigned to hazard groups 2-4

Date of issue:

Revised 1995

Information on supplied Cultures of Microfungi as required under COSHH regulations and HSW Acts 6(4)(c)

Fungus names:  

The fungi supplied (as listed above) are not categorised as Risk Group 2, 3 or 4 under EU Directive 90/679/EEC Classification of Biological Agents, and implemented in the UK through  The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens, and therefore fall into Risk Group 1, i.e. a biological agent that is most unlikely to cause human disease.  However, the fungi should be handled with care.

·     Avoid all contact with the organism, growth media or materials on which they have grown.  Many fungi produce extracellular metabolites which may be toxic.

·     Avoid inhalation of spores as they may cause allergic reactions.  Such allergies can be caused by the spores of many fungi including Alternaria, Aspergillus, Cladosporium, Doratomyces, Sporobolomyces.

To avoid these possible hazards and reduce the risk in handling, normal aseptic microbiological techniques should be employed.

All parcels containing fungi should be opened in a laboratory with Containment Level 1 as described by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (Categorisation of pathogens according to hazard and categories of containment, 4 edition  London HMSO) and summarised below.

CONTAINMENT LEVEL 1

Containment level 1 is suitable for work with organisms of hazard group 1.  Laboratory personnel must have received instruction in the procedures conducted in the laboratory.

1.             The laboratory should be easy to clean.  Bench surfaces should be impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, solvents and disinfectants.

2.             If the laboratory is mechanically ventilated, it is preferable to maintain an inward airflow into the laboratory by extracting room air to the atmosphere.

3.             The laboratory must contain a wash-basin or sink that can be used for hand washing.

4.             The laboratory door should be closed when work is in progress.

5.             Laboratory coats or gowns should be worn in the laboratory and removed when leaving the laboratory suite.

6.             Eating, chewing, drinking, smoking, storing of food and applying cosmetics must not take place in the laboratory.

7.             Mouth pipetting must not take place.

8.             Hands must be disinfected or washed immediately when contamination is suspected, after handling viable materials, and also before leaving the laboratory.

9.             All procedures must be performed so as to minimise the production of aerosols.

10.           Effective disinfectants must be available for immediate use in the event of spillage.

11.                 Bench tops should be cleaned regularly after use.                                                                       

12.                 Used laboratory glassware and other materials awaiting sterilisation must be stored in a safe manner.  Pipettes if placed in disinfectant, must be totally immersed.

13.           All waste material which is not to be incinerated should be rendered non-infective before disposal.

14.           Materials for disposal must be transported in robust containers without spillage.

16.           All accidents and incidents must be reported.

Page 2 of 2

Opening cultures and ampoules  All parcels containing microorganisms must be opened in a laboratory by trained personnel and, ideally, in a cabinet that will prevent inhalation of aerosols.

The fungus is supplied either growing on a suitable agar slope or as a freeze-dried preparation.  Both may be stored in the laboratory prior to use, the first in a 20-25亱C microbiological incubator for 2 - 6 weeks and the latter in a refrigerator for microbiological use for 5 - 30 years.

Details of suitable media, incubation temperatures for the growth of the strains and any known special hazard are given with the strain(s) supplied.

The freeze-dried preparation is opened and transferred to growth media as follows:

Care should be taken in opening freeze-dried or lyophilised cultures.  The ampoule should be marked with a glass cutter/file near the middle of the cotton wool plug and a hot glass rod used to crack the glass.  Time is allowed for air to filter through the plug into the ampoule and the pointed tip should be snapped off.

Failure to allow air to gently enter will result in a rush of air generating an aerosol and releasing the microorganism.  The plug may be impregnated with dried culture and should not be handled.  This plug should be replaced with a fresh sterile plug.  The addition of water/medium should be a gradual process avoiding squirting the liquid onto the dried material which will generate an aerosol.  Transfer of the now liquid culture after a period for absorption of water (at least 30 min) should be carried out carefully.

Transport

If the materials are to be transported to another laboratory they should be packaged with enough absorptive material to absorb all contents of the containers in case of breakage.  They should be placed in containers that will prevent breakage.  If they are to be sent abroad they must be placed in a tin within another tin clearly labelled as containing biological specimens and all postal regulations of the recipient country must be followed.  Fungi should not be forwarded to third parties outside your company.

Disposal

All fungi, media and containers should be sterilised by autoclaving at 121亱C for 15 min before disposal by suitable means such as incineration.

Procedures in case of spillage

If the fungus is spilt or its container broken, thoroughly wet with a disinfectant, such as 4% sodium hypochlorite, and allow 30 min before swabbing up and transferring into a container for autoclaving.


Page 1 of 2

b.  To accompany cultures assigned to hazard group 2 (CABI Bioscience UK Centre (Egham) does not supply organisms of hazard groups 3 or 4.

Date of Issue:

Revised 1995

Information on Supplied Cultures of Microfungi as required under COSHH regulations and HSW Act s.6(4)(c)

Fungus names:

The fungus (or fungi) supplied (as listed above) are Risk Group 2 organisms under EU Directive 90/679/EEC Classification of Biological Agents to be adopted by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) Categorisation of biological agents, 4 edition.  These are biological agents that may cause human disease and which might be a hazard to laboratory workers but are unlikely to spread to the community.  Laboratory exposure rarely produces infection and effective prophylaxis or effective treatment is available.

·         Avoid all contact with the organism, growth media or materials on which they have grown.  Many fungi produce extracellular metabolites which may be toxic.

·         Avoid inhalation of spores as they may cause allergic reaction.  Such allergies are caused by the spores of fungi including Alternaria, Aspergillus, Cladosporium, Doratomyces, Sporobolomyces and many more.

To avoid these possible hazards, and reduce the risk in handling, normal aseptic microbiological techniques should be employed.  All parcels containing fungi should be opened in a laboratory with containment level 2 as described by The Advisory Committee on dangerous pathogens 1990 (Categorisation of pathogens according to hazard and categories of containment.  London: HMSO).  Any work that may result in the creation of an aerosol containing the organism must be carried out in an appropriate microbiological safety cabinet.

CONTAINMENT LEVEL 2

Containment level 2 is suitable for use with agents of in Hazard Group 2.  Laboratory personnel must receive instruction and training in handling pathogens and an appropriate standard of supervision of the work must be maintained.

1.        The laboratory should be easy to clean.  Bench surfaces should be impervious to water and resistant to acids, alkalis, solvents and disinfectants.

2.        Access to the laboratory should be limited to laboratory personnel and other specified persons.

3.        There should be adequate space (24m3) in the laboratory for each worker.

4.        If the laboratory is mechanically ventilated, an inward airflow into the laboratory must be maintained by extracting room air to atmosphere.

5.        The laboratory must contain a wash hand basin which should be located near the laboratory exit.  Taps should be of a type which can be operated without being touched by hand.

6.        An autoclave for the sterilisation of waste materials must be readily accessible, normally in the same building as the laboratory.

7.        The laboratory door should be closed when work is in progress.

8.        Laboratory coats or gowns, which should be side or back fastening, must be worn in the laboratory and removed when leaving the laboratory suite.  Separate storage (pegs) must be provided in the laboratory suite for this clothing.

9.        Eating, drinking, smoking, storing of food and applying cosmetics must not take place in the laboratory.

10.     Mouth pipetting must not take place.

11.     Hands must be disinfected or washed immediately when contamination is suspected, after handling infective materials, and also before leaving the laboratory.


Page 2 of 2

12.     In general, work may be conducted on the open bench, but care must be taken to minimise the production of aerosols.  For manipulations such as vigorous shaking or mixing and ultrasonic disruption etc., a microbiological safety cabinet (Class 1 or Class II) or equipment which is designed to contain the aerosol must be used.  The cabinet must exhaust to the outside air or to the laboratory air extract system (see para 34, 14(b) of ACDP Categorisation of pathogens and their containment levels).

13.     Effective disinfectants must be available for routine disinfection and immediate use in the event of spillage.

14.     Bench tops should be disinfected after use.

15.     Used laboratory glassware and other materials awaiting sterilisation must be stored in a safe manner.  Pipettes if placed in disinfectant must be totally immersed.

16.     Material for autoclaving must be transported to the autoclave in robust containers, without spillage.

17.     All waste materials must be made safe before disposal or removal to the incinerator.

18.     All accidents and incidents must be immediately reported to, and recorded by, the person responsible for the work.

Opening cultures and ampoules All parcels containing microorganisms must be opened in a laboratory by trained personnel and, ideally, in a cabinet that will prevent inhalation of aerosols.

The fungus is supplied either growing on a suitable agar slope or as a freeze-dried preparation.  Both may be stored in the laboratory prior to use, the first in a 20-25亱C microbiological incubator for 2-6 weeks and the latter in a refrigerator for microbiological use for 5-30 years.

Details of suitable media, incubation temperatures for the growth of the strains, and any known special hazards, are supplied with the strains.

The freeze-dried preparation is opened and transferred to growth media as follows:

                Care should be taken in opening freeze-dried or lyophilised cultures.  The ampoule should be marked with a glass-cutter/file near the middle of the cotton wool plug and a hot glass rod used to crack the glass.  Time is allowed for air to filter through the plug into the ampoule and the pointed tip should be snapped off.

                Failure to allow air to gently enter will result in a rush of air generating an aerosol and releasing the microorganism.  The plug may be impregnated with dried culture and should not be handled.  This plug should be replaced with a fresh sterile plug.  The addition of water/medium should be a gradual process avoiding squirting the liquid onto the dried material which will generate an aerosol.  Transfer of the now liquid culture after a period for absorption of water (at least 30 min) should be carried out carefully as previously described.

Transport  If the materials are to be transported to another laboratory they should be packaged with enough absorptive material to absorb all contents of the containers in case of breakage.  They should be placed in containers that will prevent breakage.  If they are to be sent abroad they must be placed in a tin within another tin clearly labelled as containing biological specimens and all postal regulations of the recipient country must be followed.  Fungi should not be forwarded to third parties outside your company.

Disposal   All fungi, media and containers should be sterilised by autoclaving at 121亱C for 15 min before disposal by suitable means such as incineration.

Procedures in case of spillage  If the fungus is spilt or its container broken, thoroughly wet with a disinfectant, such as 4% sodium hypochlorite, and allow 30 min before swabbing up and transferring into a container for autoclaving. BACK to text

Web sites with further information on transport and shipping

BACK to text

Canadian Transport

www.rural-gc.agr.ca/e4.1_canutec.html

EBIS

www.ivr.nl/ebis.html
www.ccohs.ca/products/database/tdg.html

European Commission DGVII – Transport

http://europa.en.int/en/comm/dg07/index.htm

Harmonisation of UN documents etc.

www.hazmat.dot.gov/rules

International Air Transport Association

www.IATA.org/cargo/dg

 and www.IATA.org/cargo/dg/links.htm

International Civil Aviation Authority

http://hazmat.dot.gov/icao.htm
www.volpe.dot.gov/ohm/icao.htm

also  www.cam.org/~icao/menu3.html

National Chemical Emergency Response UK

www.eat.co.uk/ncec/complian/bibliog/bibliog.htm

OECD - Harmonisation Documents

 

Chemical programme

http://www.oecd.org/ehs

Classification and labelling 

http://www.oecd.org/class

Chemical testing    

http://www.oecd.org/test

Currently available test guidelenies

http://www.oecd.org/test/testlist

RID/ADR

http://hazmat.dot.gov/RIDADR.htm
www.dsidat.com/products/undisk7.htm
www.volpe.dot.gov/ohm/ridadr.htm

Transport – general

                                                 German magazine

www.tci-transport.fr
www.hazmathelp.com/dotlink.htm
www.cefic.org
www.storck-verlag.com/english/gela_e.htm

United Nations meeetings agenda and minutes

www.unece.org/unece/trans/danger/meetdoc.htm

UN Model Regulations

www.ununece.org/unece/trans/main/dgdemo/intro.htm

UN Comittee of Experts

www.tc.gc.ca/tdgoods/consult/unlinks_e.htm

Universal Postal Union

http://ibis.ib.upu.org http://unicc/unece/trade/facil/upustr.htm

USA Dept of Transport's Office of Hazardous Materials Management

http://hazmat.dot.gov

European IDAs

BACK to text

Collections designated as International Depository Authorities in Europe

BCCMTM IHEM, Scientific Institute of  Public Health - Louis Pasteur

Belgium

Fungi, yeasts

BCCMTM LMBP, Universiteit Gent, Vakgroep voor Moleculaire Biologie

Belgium

Plasmids

BCCMTM LMG, Universiteit Gent (RUG), Laboratorium voor Microbiologie, Bacteria Collection

Belgium

Bacteria

BCCMTM MUCL, Mycotheque de l'Universite Catholique de Louvain, Faculté des Sciences Agronomiques (UCL)

Belgium

Fungi, yeasts

CABI Bioscience UK Centre

UK

Bacteria, fungi, nematodes, yeasts

CBS - Centraalbureau voor Schimmelcultures

Netherlands

Bacteria, fungi, yeasts

CCAP, Culture Collection of Algae and Protozoa

UK

Algae, protozoa

CCM, Czech Collection of Microorganisms, Masaryk University

Czech Republic

Bacteria, fungi

CCY, Sláviková, Institute of Chemistry, Slovak Academy of Sciences

Slovakia

Yeasts

CECT, Coleccion Espanola de Cultivos Tipo, Universidad de Valencia, Edificio de Investigacion

Spain

Bacteria, fungi, yeasts

CNCM, Collection Nationale de Cultures de Microorganismes, Institut Pasteur

France

Animal cells, bacteria, phages, fungi, viruses (animal), yeasts

DBVPG, Dipartimento di Biologia Vegetale, Sez. Microbiologia Applicata

Italy

Yeast

DSMZ-Deutsche Sammlung von Mikroorganismen und Zellkulturen GmbH

Germany

Animal cells, bacteria, fungi, phages, plant cells, plasmids, viruses (plant), yeasts

ECACC, European Collection of Animal cells

UK

Animal cells

ICLC, Interlab Cell Line Collection, Department of Biotechnology, Instituto    Nazionale per la Ricerca sul cancro

Italy

Animal cells

MSCL, Microbial Strain Collection of Latvia , University of Latvia

Latvia

Bacteria, fungi, yeasts

NBIMCC, National Bank for Industrial Microorganisms and Cell Cultures

Bulgaria

Animal cells, bacteria, fungi, viruses (animal and plant), yeasts

NCAIM, National Collection of Agricultural and Industrial Microorganisms

Hungary

Bacteria, fungi, yeasts

NCIMB, National Collection of Marine, Industrial and Food Bacteria

UK

Bacteria, phages, plasmids

NCTC, National Collection of Type Cultures

UK

Bacteria, plasmids

NCYC, National Collection of Yeast cultures

UK

Yeasts

VKM, All-Russian Collection of Microorganisms, Institute of Biochemistry and Physiology of Microorganisms, Russian Academy of Sciences

Russia

Bacteria, fungi, plasmids, yeasts

VKPM, Russian National Collection of Industrial Microorganisms

Russia

Bacteria, fungi, phages, plasmids, yeasts

Contact details are available via the ECCO and WDCM web sites

ECCO –  http://www.eccosite.org

WDCM – http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp

Text of the Biological Weapons Convention BACK

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972
Entered into force on
26 March 1975
Depositaries:
UK , US and Soviet government

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous of Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

1. Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition on the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous of Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.


Summary of the Geneva Protocol BACK

PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE ENTRY INTO FORCE: 8 February 1928 The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, in the name of their respective governments: Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world; and Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; Declare: That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration. The High Contracting Parties will exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol. Such accession will be notified to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all signatories and acceding Powers, and will take effect on the date of the notification by the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are both authentic, shall be ratified as soon as possible. It shall bear to-day's date. The ratifications of the present Protocol shall be addressed to the Government of the French Republic, which will at once notify the deposit of such ratification to each of the signatory and acceding Powers. The instruments of ratification of and accession to the present Protocol will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic. The present Protocol will come into force for each signatory Power as from the date of deposit of its ratification, and, from that moment, each Power will be bound as regards other Powers which have already deposited their ratifications. In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol. Done at Geneva in a single copy, the seventeenth day of June, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-Five. _

Information on the Australia Group BACK

The Australia Group

The Australia Group is an informal group of countries, which are committed to combating the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The countries participating in the Group are suppliers and/or transshippers of chemicals, biological agents and/or production equipment which could be used in chemical and/or biological weapons programmes. The Group came into existence during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, after it became evident that Iraq had used chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Iran subsequently used chemical weapons itself. This development and the fact that materials for these chemical weapons programmes had been obtained on the international market prompted the establishment of the Group.

At first, the Australia Group concentrated on the necessity of imposing export control on dual-use chemicals.  Biological weapons, controls have been introduced on human, animal and plant pathogens, as well as dual-use equipment. Thus, the Australia Group countries are now applying licensing measures covering relevant dual-use items and technology for both chemical and biological weapons.

Since 1990, the membership of the Group has grown from 21 to 31. The expansion of the Australia Group is a result of consistent efforts by a number of the member states. In addition, outreach activities have been undertaken with a view to encouraging more countries to impose similar export licensing measures even without joining the Group. Export controls of chemicals, biological agents and dual-use equipment is an essential measure in the light of the risk of further proliferation of the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The control measures of the Australia Group countries are consistent with the policy of effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 (particularly the Article III obligation to prevent the transfer of materials which might assist a biological weapons programme) and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Article I of the Convention requires States Parties to refrain from actions which would assist anyone in any way in acquiring chemical weapons. In fact, the Convention contains a number of provisions relating to the transfer of chemicals which pose a risk to the Convention. Many members of the Australia Group are individually playing an active role in the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. The OPCW Preparatory Commission started its work one month after the signing of the Convention by 137 countries in Paris in January 1993.

The Biological Weapons Convention does not contain any effective verification mechanism. The Australia Group controls therefore help to address a weakness in the provisions of the Convention, and evidence that a number of countries including States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention are pursuing biological weapons programmes. Being a relatively small group of like-minded nations, the Australia Group can revise its controls relatively quickly.

http://www.dfat.gov.au/isecurity/pd/pd_4_96/pd9.html


Australia Group Members : Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

http://www.dfat.gov.au/isecurity/pd/pd_4_96/pd9.html

BACK


Australia Group organism list BACK

HUMAN AND ANIMAL PATHOGENS

Viruses, whether natural, enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures, as follows:

ARENAVIRIDAE:

 

Junin

 

Lassa fever

 

Lymphocytic choriomeningitis

 

Machupo

Hantaviruses

 

Hantaan (Korean haemorrhagic fever)

Nairoviruses

 

Crimean/Congo haemorrhagic fever

Phleboviruses

 

Rift valley fever

FILOVIRIDAE

 

Ebola

 

Marburg

FLAVIVIRIDAE

Flaviviruses

 

Dengue viruses types 1-4

 

Japanese B encephalitis

 

Russian spring-summer encephalitis virus

(tick borne encephalitis)

 

Yellow fever

POXVIRIDAE

 

white pox

TOGAVIRIDAE

Alphaviruses

 

Chikungunya

 

Eastern equine encephalomyelitis

 

Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis

 

Western equine encephalamyelitis

Bacteria, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

Bacillus anthracis

Brucella abortus

Brucella melitensis

Brucella suis

Burkholderia mallei

(Pseudomonas mallei)

Burkholderia pseudomallei

(Pseudomonas pseudomallei)

Chlamydia psittaci

Clostridium botulinum

Francisella tularensis

Mycoplasma mycoides

Mycoplasma mycoides sub species mycoides SC variant

Mycoplasma mycoides sub species mycoides LC variant

Mycoplasma mycoides var capri

Mycoplasma capricolum sub species capripneumoniae

Salmonella typhi

Shigella dysenteriae

Vibrio cholerae

Yersinia pestis

Toxins as follows

Botulinum toxin

Clostridium perfringens toxin

Conotoxin

Ricin

Saxitoxin

Shiga toxin

Staphylococcus aureus toxin

Tetrodoxin

Verotoxin

Microcystin (Cyanginosin)

Rickettsiae, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

Coxiella burnetii

Rickettsia prowazekii

Rickettsia quintana

Rickettsia rickettsii

Genetically-modified 乬microorganisms乭 as follows:

(c)     Genetically modified organisms or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences associated with pathogenicity and are derived from organisms covered by the Australia Group regulations;

b Genetically modified 乬microorganisms乭 or genetic elements that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins specified in the toxins section.

ANIMAL PATHOGENS, as follows

Viruses, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

African horse sickness virus

African swine fever virus

Avian influenza viruses ,which are

a uncharacterised;or

b defined in EC directive 92/40/EC as having high pathogenicity, as follows:

(c)     Type A viruses with an IVPI (intravenous pathogenicity index) in 6 week old chickens of greater than 1.2 or

2. Type A viruses H5 or H7 subtype for which nucleotide sequencing has demonstrated multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site of haemagglutinin;

Bluetongue virus

Foot & Mouth disease virus

Goat pox virus

Porcine herpes virus (Aujesky乫s disease)

Swine fever virus

Lyssa virus

All other species of the genus Lyssavirus

Newcastle disease virus

Newcastle disease virus (avian paramyxovirus type 1) which are

(c)     uncharacterised; or

(b) have an intracerebral pathogenicity index in one day old chicks of 0.4 or more, when not less than 10 million 50% egg infectious doses (EID 50) are administered to each bird in the test.

Peste des petits ruminants virus

Porcine enterovirus type 9

Rinderpest virus

Sheep pox virus

Teschen disease virus

Vesicular stomatitis virus

 

PLANT PATHOGENS, as follows:

Bacteria, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

Xanthomonas albilineans

Xanthomonas campestris pv. Citri including strains referred to as Xanthomonas campestris pv citri types A,B,C,D,E or otherwise classified as Xanthomonas citri, Xanthomonas campestris pv aurantifolia or Xanthomonas campestris pv citrumelo

Fungi, whether natural enhanced or modified, either in the form of isolated live cultures or as a material including living material which has been deliberately inoculated or contaminated with such cultures as follows:

Colleotrichum coffeanum var virulans

Cochliobolus miyabeanus

(Helminthosporium oryzae)

(Drechslera oryzae)

Microcyclus ulei (syn Dothidella ulei, Melanopsammopsis ulei))

Puccinia graminis (syn. Puccinia graminis f. sp. tritci)

Puccinia striiformis (syn Puccinia glumarum)

Magnaporthe grisea/Pyricularia oryzae)

BACK

AFSSAPS information

O.J Number 223, dated 26 september 2001, page 15201

BACK

General Texts

Health

Decision dated 22 september 2001 regarding the implementation, import, export, storage, transfer free of charge or for remuneration, purchase and transport of certain agents responsible for infectious diseases, pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins.

NOR : SANP0123410A

The minister responsible for health,

Given the public health code, in particular articles L. 5132-1, L. 5132-6, L. 5132-8, L. 5132-9, N. 5171 and R. 5208-1 ;

Given the decree dated 22 septembre 2001, placing poisonous substances on list 1 ;

With regard to the proposal by the general manager of the French agency for the safety of health products ;

Having considered that some agents responsible for infectious illnesses, pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins are at times used in the production of health products and thus can be considered raw materials for pharmaceutical use ;

Having considered that fraudulent use of these agents, pathogenic micro-organisms, and toxins might present a danger to public health, it is therefore necessary to subject such agents, pathogenic micro-organisms or toxins to special conditions both with regard to their application corresponding to production activities, transformation and employment, their import, export, storage, transfer free of charge or for remuneration, their purchase and their transport,

Decrees :

Article 1 – The provisions of paragraph 3 of section III of chapter I of document III of book V (second part : Council of State Decrees) of the public health code are applicable to the agents responsible for infectious diseases, pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins listed in the appendix with regard to their production, import, export, storage transfer free of charge or for remuneration, their purchase and their transport and, in a general manner, all agricultural, crafts, commercial or industrial operations for research or teaching purposes relative to these agents, micro-organisms and toxins, in the conditions defined in this decree.

Article 2 – The authorisation mentioned in article R 5171 of the code of public health can be agreed only for the production of health products, research or teaching. Such authorisation can only be granted to individuals.

It can also include special conditions, especially with regard to genetic modifications of the agents, pathogenic micro-organisms or toxins which are covered by the authorisation.

Article 3 – The authorisation is granted for every operation by the general manager of the French agency for the safety of health products.

However, when purchase, operation, storage and transport operations are carried out by pharmaceutical companies in order to produce health products, the authorisation can be granted for a series of operations.

It is kept by the holder and shall be presented upon any request from the competent authorities.

It must be returned to the French agency for the safety of health products when it concerns purchase, operation and storage operations and when a modification intervenes in the elements produced to support the request.

It can not be granted and it is officially withdrawn upon condemnation for an infraction to the provisions of this decree.

Article 4 – The autorisation mentions :

-  The name of the agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin concerned ;

-         The quantity of agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin which is the object of the authorisation, when the authorisation is granted for research or teaching purposes or when it regards import, export, sale or transport activities, if such take place ;

-         The use foreseen ;

-         The name and address of the individual holding the authorisation, the supplier and the transporters. When the authorisation concerns an import or export operation, the authorisation must also mention :

-         The customs office and both the individual making the customs declaration and his/her representative ;

-         The mode of transport.

Article 5 – All purchase or sales operations are entered in a special register managed by the mayor or by the police commissioner.

The entry of each operation in this register receives an order number. This must be made at the time of the operation without blanks, deletions or surchages.

For each agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin concerned, the following are indicated :

-  the colony ;

-  the type ;

-  the variety ;

-  the quantity ;

-  the date and the registration order number ;

-  the name and address of the holder ;

-  the operation carried out ;

-  the authorisation reference ;

-  the names, roles and addresses of other persons involved in the operations mentioned in article 1.

This special register is kept for ten years from the date of the last operation mentioned in order to be presented upon any request made by the competent authorities.

Article 6 – In the case of transit or loan of customs territory, the merchandise is accompanied by all required administrative documents.

In cases other than transit or loan of customs territory, the agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin mentioned in article 1 must be presented, upon its import or export, to the customs service, together with accompanying documentation.

After having controlled the merchandise, the customs officers are responsible for endorsing the import or export authorisation form issued by the French agency for the safety of health products and the latter must be notified.

Article 7 – The individuals holding the authorisation, as set out in article 2, are required to draw up an annual statement summary for each agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin identified by its colony, its type and its variety, or its nature :

1 -   The quantities purchased ;

2 -   The amount of stock held at the end of the year, including stocks of agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin being transformed ;

3 -   The quantity used for the production of transformation, indicating colony, type, variety, or its nature and the quantity of agent, pathogenic micro-organism or toxin obtained ;

4 -   The quantities yielded.

This statement which covers the previous year (1 january – 31 december) shall be sent no later than 15 february to the general manager of the French agency for the safety of health products.

Article 8 – The general manager of the French agency for the safety of health producs may request a summary statement of stock at any time, from the holder of the authorisation mentioned in article 2.

Article 9 – The police autorities, the regional pharmacy inspectorate and the French agency for the safety of health products must be notified immediately of any theft or loss.

Article 10 – The general manager for health and the general manager of the French agency for the safety of health products are responsible, each for their own departments, for the execution of this decree, which shall be published in the Official Journal of the French Republic.

Paris, 22 september 2001

Bernard Kouchner

APPENDIX

Agents of infectious diseases and pathogenic micro-organisms :

-  plague ;

-  bacillus anthracis ;

-  brucellasis ;

-  small pox and pox virus ;

-  haemorrhagic fever agents ;

-  clostridium botulinum.

Toxins :

-  botulinic toxins ;

-  staphylococcal enterotoxin B ;

-  saxitoxins ;

-  ricin ;

-  diphtheria toxin.